CO129-590-25 Accounts of events leading up to surrender and subsequent treatment of prisoners- etc 23-4-1942 - 28-9-1943 — Page 118

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and possibly increased, force up to the moment the expedition sailed on October 27. A telegram from the War Office in England to National Defence Headquarters in Ottawa, dated October 30, 1941, which, by the consent of the War Office, I am enabled to publish, reads as follows:-

We are very grateful to you for despatching your contingent to H Kong at such short notice. We fully realize the difficulties of mobilization and of distance which have had to be overcome. The moral effect of their arrival in November will be much greater than it would have been two months later.

The rapidity with which events proceeded in the closing months of the year 1941 must not be overlooked in assessing the responsibilities of statesmen and soldiers in respect of measures taken in the light of information available in September and October, and with reference to the probabilities as suggested by such information. Statesmen and soldiers can properly be held accountable for a reasonably capable practical judgment as to such probabilities, but not on the assumption that they must have had anterior knowledge of subsequent events.

Thus, after examining all the evidence bearing on the question of the authorization of the expedition, I can find no dereliction of duty or error in judgment either on the part of the Government of Canada or of its military advisers, in the decision to accept the proposal of the United Kingdom to send a Canadian force to Hong Kong, and the despatch of the force pursuant to that decision.

SECTION III—SELECTION OF THE BATTALIONS FOR THE EXPEDITION

The Government of Canada having decided to comply with the request of the United Kingdom, it became necessary to select the units that should comprise the expeditionary force, which was officially known as Force "C". This selection was made in accordance with the recommendation of the Chief of the General Staff, General Crerar, on September 30, 1941, which received the approval of the Minister of National Defence on October 9. General Crerar recommended the designation of the Royal Rifles of Canada, from Quebec, and the Winnipeg Grenadiers, from Manitoba. General Crerar accepted the sole responsibility for advising the Government in respect of this recommendation, although his conclusion was reached after full discussion with officers of the General Staff, the General-Officer-Commanding the 4th Division, and with other officers. He says that the reasons upon which he acted were those given by him in the document in which he presented his recommendation to the Minister. I reproduce this document textually.

It should be stated that there were at the time in Canada 26 battalions of infantry. These battalions had been mobilized at different times and had reached various stages of training. Nine of them constituted the 4th Division of the Canadian Active Army which was destined for service in Great Britain- had been "earmarked" for service in the Canadian Corps, to use the expression of General McNaughton.

General Crerar's recommendation is as follows:-

The Minister

Sept. 30, 1941.

1. Pursuant to the recent decision of the Government to despatch two rifle battalions to Hong Kong, I have given consideration to the selection of the units for this duty.

2. As these units are going to a distant and important garrison where they will be detached from other Canadian forces, a primary consideration is that they should be efficient, well-trained battalions, capable of upholding the credit of the Dominion in any circumstances.

3. Further, in order to adhere to the principle of territorial repre- sentation, I consider it most desirable that one unit should come from Western Canada and the other from Eastern Canada.

4. It would be possible to choose two battalions from the 4th Divi- sion which would meet the above requirements. But I do not recommend this course.

The 4th Division has been constituted as a formation for some considerable time. On purely military grounds it would be unsound to disrupt it, if this can be avoided.

5. Further, I feel that anything which might be construed in the minds of the public, or in the Army itself, as the beginning of a break-up I may of this division would be certain to have an adverse reaction. add that these are also the views of the G.O.C. 4th Division.

6. Therefore, I consider the selection of units for Hong Kong should be made from those not forming part of the order-of-battle of the 4th Division.

7. This leaves for consideration the Infantry (Rifle) Battalions now responsible for coast defence and those forming the three Brigades of the 6th Division, certain of which latter are only now mobilizing, are not trained and must, therefore, be ruled out.

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